Appeal, Criminal Defense, DUI, Leaving the Scene, Legal Blog, LSA

Leaving the Scene of an Accident

An interesting legal question was posed by the 1st DCA this week regarding the jury instructions for the charge of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Causing Death or Serious Bodily Injury (Florida Statute 316.027). In the case, the defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident causing death (and vehicular homicide), after drinking for approximately 7 hours, and then driving his car while a firework was exploding inside the car, crashing into someone causing death, and then driving away. 

During trial, the court read to the jury a jury instruction that stated the State must prove that the defendant either knew or should have known that he was involved in a crash. 

However, the statute for Leaving the Scene of an Accident Causing Death provided that it is only a first degree felony for the driver of a vehicle who causes a crash resulting in death to willfully fail to stop and remain at the scene.

Therefore, the defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instruction misstates the law: a person cannot willfully leave the scene of a crash without actually knowing that the crash occurred.

The 1st DCA agreed with the defendant, overturned the conviction, and certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court as an issue of great public importance.

The 4th DCA in Palm Beach County has also certified this question in Dorsett v. State, where the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the standard jury instruction for Leaving the Scene of an Accident Causing Death did not accurately state the law because a defendant must have actual knowledge of the crash in order to be held convicted for leaving the scene of a crash under the statute for Leaving the Scene of an Accident Causing Death.

 

Casey Reiter is an associate attorney at Stuart R. Manoff & Associates, P.A. in West Palm Beach, Florida, practicing in the areas of Criminal Defense and Marital Law.

Battery, Burglary, Criminal Defense, Legal Blog

Invoking Rights During Questioning

An interesting case from the 1st DCA was published this week and it provides a good discussion relative to my recent blog “Miranda Warnings – Infographic,” 

In the case of State of Florida v. Parker, the 1st DCA revisited the important issue of constitutional rights during an interrogation of a suspect. In that case, the suspect was being questioned by police in connection with a burglary with battery charge (in addition to other charges). Burglary-battery, or “burg-batt,” is a first degree felony in the State of Florida, punishable by up to life in prison, and found under Florida Statute 810.02.

During the questioning, the following questions and answers (at issue) allegedly took place:

Suspect: “Can you just tell me if I need to get a lawyer or something?”

Officer: “Listen, that’s your right. But what I’m interested in is the truth.”

At this point, the suspect allegedly made incriminating statements. 

 

Suspect “Is there a lawyer in the building?”

Officer: “No, you would have to call one.”

The suspect was ultimately placed under arrest. During his case, the suspect (now defendant) filed a motion to suppress his incriminating statements, arguing that the police officer had violated his constitutional rights by not giving him a straightforward answer. The law regarding this issue requires police officers to stop the interview when a suspect asks a question concerning his or her rights, and make a good-faith effort to give a simple and straightforward answer. Once the officer answers the question, appropriately, the officer can continue the interview unless the suspect invokes his her her rights (such as his or her right to remain silent and right to counsel). However, Florida courts have held that when an officer gives an evasive answer, skips the question, or talks over the suspect, the officer has violated Florida’s Constitution and the US Constitution, and any incriminating statements obtained as a result of the constitutional violations may be suppressed as coerced.

 

In this case, the Court found that the officer had in fact made a good-faith effort to appropriately answer the suspects questions regarding his rights. As a result, the incriminating statements the suspect made about himself were admissible in trial.

Interestingly, the Court also mentioned in its ruling that the suspect’s question about “whether there was a lawyer in the building” was not an unequivocal invocation of his right to an attorney. That is an example of why it is extremely important for anyone being questioned by police to know his or her rights so that he or she can properly invoke them if he/she chooses to do so. Many people do not know their rights or the steps they have to take to invoke them. An unclear question regarding a suspect’s rights will not be sufficient to invoke them. A person who wants to stop the interrogation to speak with a lawyer has to clearly make the request. Anyone who has questions regarding their rights during a police interrogation should contact a criminal defense attorney.

 

Casey Reiter is an associate attorney at Stuart R. Manoff & Associates, P.A. in West Palm Beach, Florida, practicing in the areas of Criminal Defense and Marital Law.

 

Criminal Defense, Legal Blog, Search and Seizure

Consensual Encounter – Consent to Search

An interesting case recently came out in the 2nd DCA regarding consensual encounters with police officers.

In the case, a police officer initiated a consensual encounter (or, an encounter with a person who is free to leave at any point) with an 18 year old high-schooler. The officer asked the student for his identification, which the student handed to the officer. The officer placed the student’s ID card and wallet on the hood of his patrol car. The officer then asked if the student would consent to a search as an “officer safety” method to ensure the student had no weapons, which the student permitted. The officer ultimately found four hydrocodone pills in the student’s pocket, for which the student had no prescription. the student was placed under arrest for possession of hydrocodone, a felony in the State of Florida.

The student filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence (the hydrocodone pills) found by the officer, arguing that the pills were found during an unlawful search. The student argued that the encounter with the police officer transformed from a “consensual encounter,” where he was free to leave, into an illegal detention, where he was no longer free to leave, when the officer placed the student’s ID and wallet on the hood of his patrol car. The motion to suppress was denied.

In denying the motion to suppress the evidence, the court reiterated the rule of law that police officers are not required to tell people that they are free to leave during a consensual encounter. However, the 2nd DCA reversed the ruling, and held that the evidence should have been suppressed because the student was clearly being detained and not free to leave when the officer held onto his ID and wallet. Therefore, when the student allegedly consented to the search, the student’s consent was not voluntary – he felt compelled to comply with the officer’s requests as a result of the improper detention. As a result, the evidence obtained as a result of the subsequent search was found to be unlawful. The 2nd DCA ruled that the student’s case should be dismissed.

Cases where law enforcement officers conduct searches are often wrought with Constitutional issues. This case (Lane v. State of Florida) is a perfect example. However, it is important to remember that just because evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful search may be suppressed, the case will not always necessarily be thrown out all together as a result. The outcome of each case will depend on the specific facts of that case.

Anyone who has been arrested as a result of a search by a police officer should contact a criminal defense attorney to discuss the particular facts of the case and review any potential constitutional violations.

 

Casey Reiter is an associate attorney at Stuart R. Manoff & Associates, P.A. in West Palm Beach, Florida, practicing in the areas of Criminal Defense and Marital Law.

Criminal Defense, InfoFriday, Legal Blog

Miranda Warnings – Infographic

We see police officers give Miranda Warnings to people they are arresting on television all the time, but what are they really?

Miranda Rights were developed after the landmark Supreme Court Case of Miranda v. Arizona in 1966. In that case, the defendant, Miranda, was arrested for kidnapping and rape. After being interrogated for two hours by police officers without being advised of his rights, Miranda signed a confession. Miranda’s lawyer argued that the confession was not voluntary as a result, and should have been excluded as evidence from the trial. The US Supreme Court ultimately agreed, and found that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer had been violated. Interestingly, Miranda was later retried and convicted.

In its ruling, the US Supreme Court stated that prior to interrogation, a person who is in custody must be clearly informed that he/she has (1) the right to remain silent, (2) that anything he/she says can and will be used against him/her in a court of law, (3) that he/she has the right to consult with an attorney prior to and during any questioning, and (4) that if he/she cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided for him/her at no cost. 

Subsequent to the Miranda decision, it became necessary for police officers to “Mirandize,” or read a person’s Miranda Rights to them, prior to an interrogation. Although we commonly see police officers reading Miranda Rights on tv, it is not always necessary for them to do so. There are only certain, limited scenarios in which an officer has to warn a person of his/her rights, specifically: when that person is in custody and being interrogated. Many people believe that their criminal charges can be “thrown out” because an officer didn’t read Miranda. However, if a person voluntarily answered questions during a consensual encounter with police officers (for example, an officer walked up to the person on the street and asked them what they were doing), those answers can be used against them later. A person who is arrested, handcuffed and taken to jail does not have to have their rights read to them unless the officer begins asking that person questions. If the arrested person starts talking on his/her own in the back of the police car, without being asked questions, all of those statements can be used against the arrestee. Further, suspects who are informed they are free to leave and not under arrest do not have to be Mirandized, and any confession that person gives can usually be used in court. Finally, even if a person has been read Miranda Rights, that person can still waive those rights and have any subsequent confession used against them.

A person who IS placed under arrest and interrogated without being read Miranda Rights may be able to have his/her statements suppressed (or thrown out). However, that does not mean the case has to be or will be dismissed. Anyone who has questions regarding their particular case, or Miranda rights in general, should contact a criminal defense attorney.

The infographic below provides a colorful layout of Miranda Rights as they are typically read.

Miranda Warnings

 

Casey Reiter is an associate attorney at Stuart R. Manoff & Associates, P.A. in West Palm Beach, Florida, practicing in the areas of Criminal Defense and Marital Law.

Appeal, Criminal Defense, Legal Blog, Solicitation

Constitutionality of Solicitation Fines in Florida

A county court in Florida recently certified an important issue to the Second District Court of Appeal regarding excessive fines as a punishment for solicitation of prostitution.

In the case, the defendant was charged by Information with Solicitation of Prostitution, under Florida Statute 796.07(2). Solicitation for Prostitution is a second degree misdemeanor in the State of Florida, and second degree misdemeanors are punishable by up to 60 days in county jail, and a fine of up to $500, except where a specific statute allows for a higher fine. In the case of solicitation for prostitution, as of January 1, 2013, the fine is mandated by statute to be $5,000 instead of $500 for a first offense. The Defendant filed a “Motion to Find Statute Unconstitutional,” arguing that the fine was grossly disproportion to the offense, and therefore excessive under (1) the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which provides that: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” and (2) under Article I, Section 17 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that: “Excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden.”

The court initially reserved jurisdiction on deciding the defendant’s motion. The defendant then entered a plea of nolo contendere (or “no contest”) and was sentenced to, among other things, six months of probation, twenty-five hours of community service, and a $5,000 fine. After sentencing the defendant, the court ruled on the defendant’s “Motion to Find Statute Unconstitutional.”

The court ultimately agreed with the defendant, granted the defendant’s motion, and struck the $5,000 fine, finding that a fine may be considered unconstitutional if it is so unreasonably excessive that it shocks the conscience of a reasonable person. The court then certified the question to the Second District Court of Appeal as a matter of great public importance, asking the Appellate Court to decide if a $5,000 fine for a first violation of solicitation of prostitution is unconstitutionally excessive. It will be interesting to see if and how the 2nd DCA rules on this question.

 

Casey Reiter is an associate attorney at Stuart R. Manoff & Associates, P.A. in West Palm Beach, Florida, practicing in the areas of Criminal Defense and Marital Law.